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
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FREEDOM OF TEACHING IN THE UNITED STATES

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Progressive societies are forever at war within themselves. The established order is adjusted to things as they are on the theory that all is well with the world. Vested interests depend on fixity and continuity in the social machinery. Change means disturbance of the existing machinery, but above all it involves the pain-cost of adjustment to new modes of action. This causes material loss and it disturbs those ties of sentiment which give sanctity to whatever has been long established. Social ancestor-worship which sanctifies customs and institutions long outlasts religious ancestor-worship, of which it is doubtless a subconscious survival.

“Woe to them
Who lay irreverent hands upon his old
Home furniture, the dear inheritance
From his forefathers. For time consecrates,
And what is gray with age becomes religion.”¹

Sentimental attachment to custom is, however, something more than mere inertia. Custom is the resultant of that dynamic collective wisdom which springs from experience, the net result of a long process of trial and error. Sumner has said that the ability to distinguish between pleasure and pain is the only psychical power which is to be assumed in the initial stage of human experience. “Ways of doing things were selected which were expedient. They answered the purpose better than other ways, or with less toil and pain. Along the course on which efforts were compelled to go, habit, routine, and skill were developed.” Moreover, “as time goes on the folkways become more and more arbitrary, positive, and imperative. If asked why they act in a certain way in certain cases, primitive people always answer that it is because they and their ancestors have always done so. A sanction also arises from

¹ Schiller, *The Piccolomini* (Coleridge's tr.).

ghost-fear. The ghosts of ancestors would be angry if the living should change the ancient folkways."¹

For this reason it has never been difficult to enlist an inflamed popular sentiment against innovation. Innovation involves breaking the "cake of custom," around which centers traditional reverence.² The innovator is in reality what he is always charged with being, a disturber and an enemy of whatever has been found good enough for the fathers. Every step in progressive evolution brings about a redistribution, not only of energy, but of status. Innovation involves four steps—invention, verification, communication, and social appropriation. This classification roughly describes the scope of science, which in the large sense is the sole agent of innovation. But science is in actual practice concerned chiefly with the first two steps alone. The modern university, seeking to foster all stages of knowledge, is concerned with all four. By consequence the university, if it is efficient, is always on the battle-line with reference to that part of its function which has to do with promoting path-breaking knowledge. The innovator has, throughout historical time, been the typical martyr, and the university has had to assume his risks along with his duties. HH

Under modern conditions some of the sciences are immediately useful, and their results are not only not antagonized but are ardently welcomed. This is particularly true of those utilitarian physical sciences whose achievements can be directly and peacefully assimilated into the industrial order. The quickness and ease with which scientific results will be assimilated depends on what society at the time regards as of prime importance. Because the first great advances of modern astronomy clashed with the prevailing conceptions of the universe, because they made necessary a wholly new interpretation of values, they were a real menace to the prevailing system of thought. Geology and, more recently, biology again forced a readjustment of outlook with reference to

¹ Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 2-3.

² Although it applies primarily to organic variation, Ward's definition of innovation is pertinent to social change: "Whenever the life-force breaks over the bounds of simple heredity and goes beyond the process of merely repeating and multiplying the structures that have already been created, it becomes innovation and changes the type of structure."—*Pure Sociology*, p. 243.

man's relation to the cosmic plan. The shift of emphasis away from transcendental to human and social interests has, in quite recent generations, brought the supreme stress of conflict into the field of the social sciences, where it constitutes the most vital fact of current history.

This shift has done more than to mark a change in the focus of our dominant interest. It has brought scientific research into touch with those psychic and social concerns which are a part of practical, everyday experience; concerns which men think they know about at first hand. Social science is no longer a mere instrument for the discovery of truth, but a sort of public conscience as well. The problems of general welfare, the policies that shall mold the collective life, touch not only all men but all the interests of men. "The general conduct of mankind," says Ward, "is determined by the opinions men hold. If such opinions are based on progressive principles, progressive actions will surely result. Education, from the social standpoint, is a systematic process for the manufacture of correct opinions."¹

In a well-known passage in the *Republic* Plato declares that until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, the ideal state will never be realized. To this Kant objects that "it is not to be expected that kings should philosophize or philosophers become kings, nor is it to be desired, because the possession of power invariably destroys the independent judgment of the reason. But in order that both parties may properly understand their functions it is indispensable that kings or kingly peoples should not permit the class of philosophers to perish or to become mute, but should allow them to speak openly."²

Because the physical sciences have come to be recognized as the efficient handmaids of economic success the world has begun to perceive that it cannot afford to hamper them. When social science shall be seen to be as intimately related to the function of government as chemistry and physics are to economic processes, it will also become free, and for the same reason. There is, however,

¹ Dealey and Ward, *Textbook of Sociology*, p. 306.

² Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden* (Hartenstein ed.), p. 436.

an important distinction between scientific freedom and academic freedom. Scientific investigation may be a purely individual matter. Indeed, many of the most striking discoveries in the history of science have been made by highly individualistic free-lances who have worked entirely outside of group agencies. Society cannot afford to hamper these detached geniuses; it cannot depend wholly on scientific men who are willing to trot in harness. Scientific work in the universities, on the other hand, must, in the nature of things, be co-operative. Like any other institution, the university involves co-ordination and teamwork.

Two other distinctions must also be insisted on: that between freedom of research and freedom of publication and that between freedom of research and freedom of teaching. The investigator must have a roving commission. Whatever of value can be discovered he must be free to search out to the uttermost limit, but before his results are published they ought to be subjected to such thorough verification as will demonstrate their soundness and worth. The tendency toward hasty publication not only discredits science but lessens its usefulness. This is not to imply that a theory may not properly be publicly suggested before its truth is absolutely demonstrated. Many of the best results in science come from ingenious hypotheses struck out by nimble minds capable of brilliant generalization but weak on observation or elaboration. Darwin was the prince of observers, yet he held that "without speculation there is no good and original observation," and he was especially fond of a "fool's experiments."¹

✓ The function of teaching is the communication of those more or less settled results of research and experience which have become, or are ready to become, a part of the folkways.² Its chief concern will always be that body of knowledge which has been tested and accepted. The teacher as such is, of course, not debarred from presenting the original results of his own thinking, but this should be an adjunct to his primary function. When his own opinions differ from those which are generally accepted he is under obliga-

¹ F. Darwin, *Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*, I, 465. See also p. 126.

² Reference is, of course, here had to general teaching, and not to the training of experts or specialists.

tion to present the prevailing views fully and fairly along with his own. And this is true, not because there is any call for a minute differentiation of academic function or status between teacher and investigator, but because the mastery of a fixed body of knowledge by students is a necessary preparation for critical investigation.

This is equivalent to saying that an institution whose primary function is research has a status different from that of a teaching institution. To the extent that its resources are devoted to research the university is distinct from the college. The college stands for discipline in known facts rather than for the discovery of new ones. The case for an orderly conformity is stronger here, because the college has to deal with a stage of the educational process which is preparatory to responsible freedom. It is also an agency through which the social appropriation of truth may proceed. Its efficiency in this function is to be measured largely by its alertness in catching and passing on into the social system scientific gains which research has acquired and tested.

But how are scientific results to be accounted as verified? Who shall be the final arbiters of their validity? Shall the specialists in any line constitute a high court whose verdict shall be final, or shall a scientist be compelled, under penalty, to convince a given body of laymen, say a board of trustees, that his results are genuine and worth while? In most of the physical sciences these questions have already been settled. No one outside of the specialists in mathematics, chemistry, engineering, or medicine would nowadays venture an authoritative opinion on any discovery in those fields. Even in biology the problem of evolution, only a generation ago the center of bitter warfare throughout the world of thought, is now well relegated to the biologists, and squabbles over it are accepted as family quarrels. When the momentous theory of DeVries was propounded in 1900 it awoke little echo outside the ranks of biological specialists.

But the materials of social science are the phenomena of man's own life and conduct. In these every man, because he is a man, thinks that he is a specialist. A new theory of social relationships has an actual or potential bearing on the individual as well as on the group, on material interests as well as on modes of belief. In

one sense discoveries here are not discoveries at all, but regroupings or reinterpretations of facts long familiar. They must run the gauntlet of a body of critics as large as the whole of society. Scientific work in this field cannot be detached or impersonal; it is always conditioned by its close relation to the total group-life. And on the whole it is well that this is so. Provided only that learning be otherwise unhampered, it will lose nothing by being held closely to the needs of its environment. For freedom, as Dr. E. E. Brown has said, "is not to be realized in the mere absence of responsibility. We may rather say that an institution becomes free in so far as it meets and discharges the full record of its proper responsibilities. . . . Free instruction prepares the learner for both participation in and reaction upon his institutional environment."¹

To what extent higher education is to be identified with other agencies of social control is a question upon which there is not much agreement, and yet it is a question of far-reaching significance. If teachers are to be regarded as a part of the public administration, as they were declared to be in the Prussian code of 1794, they become directly subject to the orders of the administration, which may demand whatever teaching or abstention from teaching is deemed to be for the welfare of the state as a political entity. Thus Francis II of Austria could consistently admonish the professors of the Laibach Lyceum: "New ideas are being promulgated of which I cannot and will not approve. Abide by the old; for they are good and our fathers have prospered under them—why should not we? I do not need savants, but brave citizens. It is your duty to educate the young to become such. He who serves me must learn what I command; he who cannot, or who comes to me with new ideas, can go, or I will dismiss him."²

And Napoleon, in the decree which organized the University of France, could thus define its duty: "All the schools belonging to the University shall take for the basis of their teaching, loyalty to the Emperor, to the imperial monarchy to which the happiness

¹ *Educational Review*, XIX, 224.

² Müller, *Political History of Recent Times*, p. 4.

of the people is confided and to the Napoleonic dynasty which preserves the unity of France and of all the liberal ideas proclaimed by the Constitution."¹

In contrast to such ideas should be cited the noble protest of Dahlmann, himself one of the "Goettingen seven" and the victim of a royal attempt to suppress academic freedom: "You may drive the sciences out of the universities by confining them to the propagation of traditional truths. It is by no means beyond the power of the state to transform the former seats of free culture into mere workshops, but the blow aimed at the sciences would not hurt them, for they are not unfamiliar with the wanderer's life, as much as it would hurt the youth of the state. It is by no means beyond the power of the state to compel these youths to attend such universities, but it has not the power to prevent them from desisting institutions which contradict all the academic traditions and ideals esteemed in our literature, and which public opinion indignantly scorns. For the places to which a noble ambition once led men of the highest culture would then hold merely the hod-carriers of science."²

✓ In America there are three types of universities, those supported by a church or sect, those endowed or supported by private individuals, and state or municipal institutions. Now if a private donor or a religious sect chooses to endow a college or a college chair to teach a specified set of doctrines it is their right to do so, and they also have, theoretically, the right to forbid the teaching of principles not in harmony therewith. It may not be to the interest of the general welfare that such limitations be imposed, but that is a matter that ought to be settled before, not after, such institutions are chartered. Whoever accepts appointment in such an institution or chair does so with his eyes open. His acceptance is a quasi-contract to teach in a prescribed way, and on the doctrine of assumed risk he cannot rightfully complain that his liberty is infringed. This condition, however, is an exceptional one. Whatever the intention of the donor, most gifts are unconditional, and impose no other moral obligation than the conscientious and

¹ Taine, *The Modern Régime*, II, 161.

² Dahlmann, *Die Politik*, I, 319-20 (zweite Auflage, Leipzig, 1847).

dignified promotion of sound learning.¹ It is true that in actual practice the donor may and does exercise some degree of repressive influence, often unconscious and unintentional, through the expectation of further gifts which his past beneficence has aroused.

Governing boards stand in the relation of sponsors to society or to the supporting group for the academic teachers under their control. Within recent decades a revolutionary change has taken place in the character of these boards. The clergymen-trustees of the old-style American college were generally experts in all the learning which the college taught. Differences of opinion were possible over matters of doctrine, but hardly over other matters. Modern university trustees are not generally educational experts, and certainly none are experts in more than a fractional part of the multiform scientific activities which a great university promotes. The characteristic board is one made up of financiers and "practical" men whose chief concern is for the material welfare of the institution. Whatever active interest they take in scientific results is usually limited to the bearing of those results on the immediate fame or the business interests of the institution.

✓ A recent writer expresses the opinion that society, which in successive stages was ruled by soldiers, priests, and lawyers, has now passed under the sway of "the tired business man." This change of leadership, which has also extended to the universities, explains much of the friction in educational administration. The knowledge interest and the wealth interest are not necessarily antagonistic. Business methods applied to some phases of education have done much to make it more efficient. It is only when

¹ Judge Alton B. Parker, in a paper on "The Rights of Donors" (*Educational Review*, XXIII, 21), takes the curious position that the academic teacher should have unhampered freedom of utterance outside the classroom, but in the classroom should be restrained from teaching such principles as "tend to subvert the purpose of the founders or directors of the chair he occupies." The teaching of theories in opposition to the wishes or consent of the supporters of the institution "whose servant he is" should lead to his discharge. But it rarely happens that classroom teaching is the cause of academic displacement. Public addresses and printed opinions, in which Judge Parker specifically asserts that teachers ought to be entirely free, have in the great majority of cases been the beginning of the trouble. In such cases the question is obviously one of freedom of opinion and utterance rather than of freedom of teaching.

the attempt is made to carry over into educational work the theory of the entrepreneur and the hired man that confusion arises. Possibly boards are sometimes influenced by the popular idea that scholars, being impractical, require the experienced hands of men of affairs to do for them what they are incapable of doing for themselves. As a trustee of a large Middle-Western university expressed it some years ago, "In social and political science they (the professors) are only a little less qualified to be the final arbiters as to what shall be taught than they are concerning financial problems. In all things they should promptly and gracefully submit to the final determination of the trustees. A professor must be an advocate, but his advocacy must be in harmony with the conclusions of the powers that be."¹

Sometimes boards go on the assumption that the government of the institution is a matter distinct from and superior to the educational or cultural interests for the promotion of which it exists. If this theory means only that it is well to mix the larger, less technical point of view of laymen with the routine of university control, there can be little quarrel with it. If it means that a non-educational board is to dictate university policies without regard to the scholarly point of view, it is a serious danger to those cultural values for which an institution of higher learning is supposed to stand. In an official bulletin dealing with the recent dismissal of Professor Morse, of Marietta College, the trustees of that institution declare that "it is the sacred duty of the trustees to administer the affairs of the institution according to their own judgment and the dictates of their own conscience."

Under the theory of American university organization the president is an intermediary between a non-specialist board and a body of specialist teachers. In practice it is possible for him to be the unlovely despot that he is sometimes pictured to be in superheated imaginations. This type is doubtless only an exception just numerous enough to prove the rule. A president usually begins his duties fresh from the ranks of the specialist-teacher class, and his instinctive sympathy is likely to remain with his old

¹ J. H. Raymond, a trustee of Northwestern University, cited by G. C. Cook, *Forum*, L, 451.

colleagues, for the craft-sense is not a thing that dies easily. If he is gradually caught in the meshes of administrative needs, if he loses something of the scholar's idealism, the fault most often lies with the details of the system rather than with its essentials. It is inevitable that a board of trustees should feel the stress of fiscal needs and should regard the fear of a private donor or of a legislature as the beginning of wisdom, but it is a disaster that the presidency should be swallowed by the administrative machine. Nor is it necessary that this should be. A revision of internal university administration need involve neither the abolition of the presidency nor the emasculation of the office so that the president should become a mere ceremonial or ornamental head of the faculty. Were the president relieved of some part of the excessive burden of financial concerns and of most of the mass of routine business details, his office would resume its pristine dignity of scholarly leadership. Free to become definitely class-conscious, he would be able to throw the weight of his influence on the side of scientific freedom. The traditional reverence for scholarship is not dead and will not soon die. The readjustment that will do most for the protection of academic teachers is one that will align the presidential office definitely and permanently on the side of scholarly interests.

In the history of academic freedom in America there have been three periods, typically, but not chronologically, distinct:

1. *The Theological-Moral Period.*—Here the conflict was chiefly over questions in physical science and their bearing on theological beliefs. The period began with the dawn of American science and lasted until about 1890. It was marked by the conflict of two world-views, and ended when it was definitely established that nothing which can be proved to be true is dangerous to religion or morals.

2. *The Economic-Political Period.*—Anticipations of this phase of conflict are found throughout the anti-slavery agitation, which was of course a moral as well as a political and economic movement. Its characteristic developments occur in the field of economic doctrines and their bearing on tariff policy and the money question. Examples occur of the disruption of whole faculties and the forcing

out of presidents and professors because of teachings distasteful to private backers of universities or to political majorities.¹ The period lasted, roughly, from 1885 to 1900, and happened to fall within the era when American university expansion was at its height.

3. *The Social Period.*—Now the conflict is no longer so much about particular dogmas or measures as about fundamental questions of the structure and function of society itself. Typical centers of dispute are wealth distribution and industrial organization. It is true that the disturbances are not often openly attributed directly to these larger causes, but, however specific the assigned cause, its roots will generally be found running down to these more fundamental sources. This period began about 1897.

Corresponding to these three periods are three characteristic agencies which have influenced the limitation of academic freedom: religious or theological groups, political parties or factions, and wealth interests. The last-named influence is usually represented by individual donors or large aggregations of wealth which are able to exert a coercive influence on educational policy. Each of these agencies in turn has, whenever it has ventured to work in the open, proclaimed itself the champion of that general safety and welfare which was imperilled by subversive new doctrines. It has been able to make a plausible and often a successful appeal to popular prejudice. It has exploited that social inertia which invariably resists change. That such appeals are sometimes based on conscientious conviction does not in the least diminish their power for evil or justify the enlistment of passion to help decide issues which can only be settled by the white light of reason or the cold test of experience. It is not to be denied that stubborn questioning of new theories is the surest means of testing their validity, provided such questioning be honest and intelligent. The tragedy of the situation lies in the fact that new truth has so frequently to face a type of criticism which is neither chastening nor

¹ The dismissal of Professor Banks, of the University of Florida, in 1911, because of unorthodox views on slavery and secession, was a curious example of opposition to a new interpretation of old issues rather than of resistance to a change of social policy. It belongs perhaps to the type of the first period as much as to that of the second.

constructive, but rather a darkening of counsel. Here again social science is still at a disadvantage as compared with physical. We are only at the dawn of the era of the open question in matters pertaining to social structure and policy.

There has doubtless been much exaggeration as to the number of cases of absolute suppression of academic freedom. Almost any academic teacher who loses his place is able to make some sort of showing as a martyr of freedom. There have been in the past two decades perhaps a dozen examples of violent displacement because of opinion alone; there have been many more where the issue was mixed; and there have been a still greater number where removal was due to perfectly valid causes and where the issue of academic freedom was improperly exploited. A genuine and flagrant case of violation of freedom is hard on the individual victim, but it generally arouses such active protest in academic circles as to lead in the end to strengthening the cause of freedom. There is another kind of repression in which there are no compensating advantages. This may be termed latent repression, and it may take a variety of forms. Appointments may be limited to men known to hold approved views; constant pressure may be secretly exerted to limit or avoid such teaching as would offend possible donors; official discouragement may be visited upon certain departments or courses which are under suspicion; or men whose views are not in harmony with the desired standards may be refused deserved advancement. Both the quantity and the quality of scientific achievement has been more crippled by such subterraneous influences than by those conspicuous academic tragedies whose stories have rung through the educational world.

In cases of enforced academic displacement the right of trial is rarely or never granted. Herein academic teachers are in a less favorable situation than military men or holders of political office. Denial of the right, not only of trial, but of trial by one's peers, is an anomaly in any case, and particularly where the question of competence is at all involved. Members of a man's own science-guild alone know whether his work is sound. They, too, know his weaknesses as well as his strength. And in most cases the "peers" by whom he ought to be judged are not his immediate

colleagues in other departments of the same institution, for the "luminous inaccuracy" with which a professor sometimes judges the work of his colleagues has become proverbial. If the matter is to be decided upon its merits there can be no safer arbiters than those who have at heart the welfare of a particular science and a pride in its dignity. If judged by their scientific brethren, unworthy members of the guild could not afterward pose as martyrs. In many instances they would be given less tolerant treatment than is now accorded them by governing boards.

A particular instance may be cited in proof, which if not exactly typical is at least frequent. In quite recent years a professor, not in the social sciences, was dismissed from the faculty of a certain college. He had become conspicuous locally by reason of lurid and reckless public utterances and acts, which were much exploited in the newspapers. He was, incidentally, a socialist. Immediately following his dismissal the cry was raised that he had been dropped at the dictation of certain local wealth interests. But there is every reason to believe that his balance had been disturbed by private troubles, for he had not, before those troubles began, given evidences of eccentric tendencies. When requested by the trustees to moderate his conduct his course had become only the more violent. This public defiance and challenge could hardly have been ignored by any agency of control, whether trustees or his own colleagues. The most significant feature of the situation was that other men in the same faculty held and hold identical views on social questions without resorting to intemperate utterances, and no question has ever been raised as to the security of their places. Open and fair trial by one's equals would in such a case relieve the trustees of much of the undeserved odium that is now heaped upon them when it becomes necessary to resort to the extreme measure of academic decapitation.¹

¹ "Removal of professors for incompetence is a duty of trustees and presidents which they have never half lived up to. To shift this duty onto students as has been done, or onto the elective system, as is being done, is cowardly negligence. The incompetent man should be dismissed at the first opportunity. Academic freedom demands it. For the truth has a right to be uttered through a voice competent to proclaim it. Kindness to the incompetent is treason to the truth; a betrayal of the rights of the students."—President W. D. Hyde, of Bowdoin College, *International Monthly*, IV, 12.

The nonconformist type of mind is pretty certain to be highly individualistic. Now, society cannot get on without its iconoclasts and rebels, but their proper place is not usually in institutional activities. If there is one principle in sociology which is so thoroughly settled as to have become commonplace, it is that institutional activities must be largely routine in character. Institutions are the very embodiment of habit, ancestral discipline, "inherited drill."¹ For the restraints of this routine the nonconformist has an unconquerable repugnance. He holds with Ibsen that the majority can never be right. To him a thing is undesirable merely because it is accepted and established. Such rebellious spirits sometimes profit by removal from an institution where the environment is narrow and rigid to the more genial atmosphere of a cosmopolitan institution. More frequently such men are misplaced in any institution, and would find their true sphere only in some other form of public activity. Modern society, with its infinitely varied interests, is better equipped to furnish openings for such temperamental individuals than were the rigid communities of simpler ages.

Even after granting liberal concessions as to the number of instances of unjust displacement, it remains true that the prevailing rule among academic authorities is one of tolerance and patience with types and individuals who would not long be tolerated in private business. Super-tolerance is perhaps more prevalent in academic circles than anywhere else. A scholar, being only human, has a right to make mistakes and to commit or utter folly, but he has not the right to do so habitually. Scholars as a body owe it to themselves to impose sane and salutary restraints in the matter of public utterance, lest the credit and dignity of science be diminished. Untrammelled license granted to irresponsible quacks who pose as scientists is as undesirable as restriction of freedom. The emotional faddist who believes that the whole process of social evolution could be finished up tomorrow morning if his pet idea were adopted may be an admirable person in other respects, but he has no claim to speak in the name of science.

¹ Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, p. 18.

Equally troublesome is the scholar who is a real authority in his own field but who attempts to utter authoritative opinions on other matters about which he knows little. This is to do violence to Plato's ideal of justice, which is "doing one's own business and not being a busybody." The public press does not make any clear distinction among men of academic rank. A newspaper "story" is never allowed to be weakened by explaining that the man quoted has no real knowledge of the subject. The mere title of professor is sufficient. A genuine scientist, who is extremely wary about what he publishes in his own scientific journals, may thus acquire the dangerous habit of "making the front page" with tactless utterances on things outside of his specialty. Possibly this desire for fuller expression is a survival from a pre-specialist age and a revolt against the artificial restrictions imposed by the high division of labor in intellectual pursuits,¹ but it is none the less detrimental to the welfare of the scholar-guild under conditions as they are.

Hence arises the persistent and always pertinent question, whether university teachers ought to engage actively in party politics. If the present writer holds in general to a negative answer, it is neither because so many cases of academic friction have arisen from this cause in the past nor because there is any theoretical doubt as to abstract rights in the matter. It is rather because the partisan attitude is inimical to scientific poise and catholicity of judgment. Paulsen has said that scientific thinkers "are bound to develop a habit of theoretical indifference with respect to the opposing sides, a readiness to pursue any other path in case it promises to lead to a theory more in accordance with the facts."² This theoretical indifference does not force one to become a hermit or a passive observer; it only involves avoidance of that one-sided spirit of partisanship which is incompatible with sound thinking. Whatever practical value scientific scholarship has to society lies in its aloofness from partial and prejudiced judgments.

¹ Professor Veblen, in his recent book, *The Instinct of Workmanship*, has made an illuminating study of the pathological reactions of high specialization in industry. Many of his conclusions are applicable to scientific workers.

² Paulsen, *The German Universities*, p. 255.

With a few brilliant exceptions university teachers have made poor politicians anyway. Their cast of mind is not favorable to success in politics. Exactly because the scientist's mental perspective is different from that of others his opinions and utterances are likely to be misinterpreted. And it must not be overlooked that a large proportion of the cases of academic friction that have occurred in this field have sprung out of public propagandism rather than university lectures. To breed a genuine and intelligent enthusiasm for social reform by inculcating in thoughtful students sound theories of social action is a thing quite distinct from engaging in impatient propagandism for the immediate social appropriation of those theories. A clear understanding that the function of science is to discover fundamental principles and that this function is a sufficiently useful one in itself would lessen the likelihood of friction over freedom of teaching.

Kant declared that there need be no fear of philosophers engaging in propagandism in order to control public affairs, "because this class is by its very nature incapable of banding together and forming clubs." Whether academic teachers are capable of employing trade-union methods for other purposes is a question; for purposes of protection against violation of their liberty this method is both undesirable and unnecessary. Practically every scientific interest already has a national organization which furnishes the best possible machinery for common action. If these groups could develop a stronger sense of solidarity which would lead them to take active cognizance of unjust attacks on individual scientists they would inspire a wholesome terror that would go far to discourage such action. Some of them have already taken this course in conspicuous cases, and the results have been so wholesome as to have aroused general respect.¹ This plan is to be preferred to that of the proposed Association of College Professors, because each special group knows better than anybody else its own particular problems, each has its own standards, and each knows best the

¹ Examples are the case of Professor Ross, of Leland Stanford Junior University, investigated and reported on by the American Economic Association in 1900-1901, and the case of Professor Mecklin, of Lafayette College, of which the American Philosophical Society and the American Psychological Association made a thorough investigation in 1913.

merits of its own men. All the advantages of a general organization, without its drawbacks, could be secured by co-operation among these groups in cases where common action is necessary, were the sense of common interest once thoroughly established.

Nor is self-protection against aggression the sole function of such organizations. The prestige of scholarship would be augmented if scholars themselves should undertake to weed out the incompetent and insist on high standards of ability and preparation for holders of academic positions. By emphasizing the ethical principle of the social obligation of science this would strengthen their position with both trustees and public. Presidents and trustees could then safely depend on their co-operation in the ungrateful task of clearing out of academic circles the incompetent, the immoral, and the "impossible," who can now be gotten rid of only at the risk of raising questions of violation of freedom where such questions have no proper place. For all genuine scholars agree that academic freedom is not primarily for the benefit of teachers themselves, but of students, and ultimately of society in general.

There can be no orthodoxy in science except as scientific achievement can be demonstrated to be for the social welfare. Nor can there be any finality, either in social philosophy or social organization. Were the most radical social program now extant to be embodied in actual routine practice, new and still more daring systems of thought would arise and the process would repeat itself endlessly. Those pioneers, those forerunners, who forever push beyond the frontiers of the actual are the dynamic agents of social advance. Within the body of existing society also there will always be found critics, questioners, searchers-out of new things. Without them civilization would perish of self-contented inertia. For all of these types academic life must, so far as possible, find a place within itself. Where that is impossible it must, unstudious of traditional dignity or conventional orthodoxy, accord to them sympathetic tolerance and the open mind. There is no fundamental or enduring justification of academic freedom except it lie in a steady insistence on the right to treat every question as an open question. And this is the heart of general freedom itself.

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